Abstract
Few studies have examined the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in a broad cross-section of developing countries. This paper tries to fill this lacuna by constructing a new data set on poverty, international migration and remittances for 74 low and middle-income developing countries. Four key findings emerge. First, international migration -defined as the share of a country's population living abroadhas a strong, statistical impact on reducing poverty. On average, a 10 percent increase in the share of international migrants in a country's population will lead to a 1.9 percent decline in the share of people living in poverty ($1.00/person/day). Second, distance to a major labor-receiving region (like the United States or OECD (Europe) has an important effect on international migration. Developing countries which are located closest to the United States or OECD (Europe) are also those countries with the highest rates of migration. Third, an inverted U-shaped curve exists between the level of country per capita income and international migration. Developing countries with low or high per capita GDP produce smaller shares of international migrants than do middle-income developing countries. This study finds no evidence that developing countries with higher levels of poverty produce more migrants. Because of the considerable travel costs associated with international migration, international migrants come from those income groups which are just above the poverty line in middle-income developing countries.
Finally, international remittances --defined as the share of remittances in country GDPhas a strong, statistical impact on reducing poverty. On average, a 10 percent increase in the share of international remittances in a country's GDP will lead to a 1.6 percent decline in the share of people living in poverty. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in a broad cross-section of developing countries. In the past, a number of studies have examined the effect of international migration and remittances on poverty in specific village or country settings, 2 but we are not aware of any studies which examine the impact of these phenomena on poverty in a broad range of developing countries. Two factors seem to be responsible. The first is a lack of poverty data; it is quite difficult to estimate accurate and meaningful poverty headcounts in a wide and diverse range of developing countries. The second factor relates to the nature of data on international migration and remittances. Not only do few developing countries publish records on migration flows, but many developed countries which do keep records on migration tend to undercount the large number of illegal migrants living within their borders. At the same time, the available data on international remittances do not include the large (and unknown) sum of remittance monies which are transmitted through private, unofficial channels. As a result of these data problems, a host of key policy questions 
International Migration, Remittances and Poverty
In the literature there is little agreement and scant information concerning the impact of international migration on poverty. Charles Stahl, for example, writes that "migration, particularly international migration, can be an expensive venture. Clearly it is going to be the better-off households which will be more capable of (producing international migrants)." 3 Similarly, Michael Lipton, in a study of 40 villages in India that focuses more on internal than international migration, found that "migration increases intra-rural inequalities. . . because better-off migrants are 'pulled' towards fairly firm prospects of a job (in a city or abroad), whereas the poor are 'pushed' by rural poverty and labor-replacing methods."
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Other analysts, however, suggest that the poor can and do benefit from international migration. For example, Oded Stark finds that in rural Mexico "relatively deprived" households are more likely to engage in international migration than are "better off" households. 5 In a similar vein Richard Adams, Jr. finds that in rural Egypt the number of poor households declines by 9.8 percent when household income includes international remittances, and that remittances account for 14.7 percent of total income of poor households.
6
While the findings of these past studies are instructive, their conclusions are of limited usefulness due to small sample size. Stark's findings, for instance are based on 61 households from two Mexican villages while those of Adams' are based on 1000
households from three Egyptian villages. Clearly, there is a need to extend the scope of these studies to see if their findings hold for a larger and broader collection of developing countries.
A New Data Set on International Migration, Remittances and Poverty
Our evaluation of the impact of international migration and remittances in developing countries is based on a new data set that includes information on international migration, remittances, income inequality and poverty for 74 "low income" and "middle income" developing countries. 7 These countries were selected because it was possible to find relevant migration, remittances and poverty data for all of these countries since the year 1980. 8 Since it was not easy to assemble this data set, and data problems still plague this (and all other) studies on migration and remittances, it is useful to spell out how this information was assembled.
In the case of migration, few, if any, of the major labor-exporting countries publish accurate records on the number of international migrants that they produce. It is therefore necessary to estimate migration stocks and flows by using data collected by the main labor-receiving countries. For the purposes of this paper, the main labor-receiving countries (regions) include two: United States and the OECD (Europe), excluding North America and Asia. 9 Unfortunately, no data are available on the amount of migration to the third and fourth most important labor-receiving regions in the world, the Arab Gulf and South Africa.
Because of their importance to labor-exporting countries, remittance flows tend to be the best measured aspect of the migration experience. countries (52 percent) have published the results of any household budget survey. Of these 81 developing countries, missing data on income inequality reduced the size of the data set used in this paper to 74 countries.
Annex Table A1 gives the countries, regions, poverty, inequality, migration and remittances indicators included in the new data set. The data set includes a total of 190 observations from the 74 developing countries; an observation is any point in time for which data on all the relevant variables exist. The data set is notable in that it includes 42 observations (from 21 countries) in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region for which migration and poverty data are relatively rare. It also includes observations from countries in all other regions of the developing world.
3. Calculation of Poverty, Inequality, Migration and Remittance Variables Annex Table A1 reports three different poverty measures. The first, the headcount index, set at $1 per person per day, measures the percent of the population living beneath that poverty line at the time of the survey. 13 However, the headcount index ignores the "depth of poverty," that is, the amount by which the average expenditure (income) of the poor fall short of the poverty line. 14 We therefore also report the poverty gap index, which measures in percentage terms how far the average expenditure (income) of the poor fall short of the poverty line. For instance, a poverty gap of 10 percent means that the average poor person's expenditure (income) is 90 percent of the poverty line. The third poverty measure --the squared poverty gap index -indicates the severity of poverty. The squared poverty gap index possesses useful analytical properties, because it is sensitive to changes in distribution among the poor. 15 To measure inequality, Annex Table A1 uses the Gini coefficient. In the table this measure is normalized by household size and the distributions are weighted by household size so that a given quintile (such as the lowest quintile) has the same share of population as other quintiles across the sample.
The remaining variables in Annex Table A1 -migration as share of country population and remittances as share of country GDP -are of key importance to this study. Since these two variables must be estimated using some rather heroic assumptions, it is crucial to discuss each variable in turn.
In the absence of detailed records on international migration in the laborexporting countries, the migration variable in this study is estimated by combining data from the two main labor-receiving regions of the world: the United States and OECD (Europe). Specifically, the migration variable is constructed using three steps. The final step in calculating the migration variable is to take the sum of the "foreign born" from each labor-exporting country that are living in either the United
States or the OECD (Europe), and divide this sum by the population of each developing country. These "migration as share of population" figures are the ones which appear in Annex Table A1 . In all likelihood, these figures seriously under-estimate the actual number of international migrants produced by any given labor-exporting country, because they do not include the large number of illegal migrants working in the United
States and OECD (Europe). These figures also do not count the unknown number of international migrants working in other labor-receiving regions (like the Arab Gulf).
The process of calculating the remittances variable in Annex Table A1 is more straight-forward, but it also involves one heroic assumption. All remittance data comes from the IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. As noted above, the main problem with these data is that they count only remittance monies which enter through official, banking channels; they do not include the large (and unknown) amount of remittance monies which are sent home through private, unofficial channels. For example, in one major labor-exporting country -Egypt -it has been estimated that unofficial remittances amount to between one-third and one-half of total official remittances. 18 For this reason, it is likely that the "official remittance" figures recorded in Annex 
Where P is the measure of poverty in country i at time t, β 1 is the "elasticity of poverty" with respect to mean per capita income given by µ , β 2 is the elasticity of poverty with respect to income distribution given by g, β 3 is the elasticity of poverty with respect to variable x (such as international migration or remittances) and ε is an error term that includes errors in the poverty measure. For the purposes of this study, we will use estimate equation (1) using both measures of income. This will allow us to test the robustness of our findings to different definitions of income.
In the literature equation (1) is often measured in first differences, in order to deal with possible correlation problems between the variables, since the dependent and independent variables are drawn from the same single source of data (household budget surveys). In this study, however, we will estimate equation (1) as a level equation since the dependent and independent variables come from different sources of data: the dependent variable being drawn from household budget surveys and the independent variables (for migration and remittances) from various other sources. 21 Using the migration data, OLS estimates of equation (1) are presented in Table 1 .
Since all of the variables are estimated in log terms, the results can be interpreted as elasticities of poverty with respect to the relevant variable.
In Table 1 the coefficients for both of the income variables -GDP and survey mean income--are of the expected (negative) sign and statistically significant in all cases.
However, the results for the model as a whole are better and more precise when estimated using survey mean income: the R 2 coefficients increase from the 0.4-0.5 range to 0.6-0.7.
For this reason, we will focus on the results using survey mean income.
In Table 1 the poverty elasticities with respect to income inequality (Gini coefficient) are positive, as expected, and their magnitude is consistent with other recent analyses of poverty reduction. 22 The latter outcome suggests that countries with higher income inequality also have higher poverty.
When the dependent variable in Table 1 is poverty headcount or poverty gap, the results for the migration variable are negative and statistically significant. However, when the dependent variable is squared poverty gap, the share of migrants in the country's population has no significant impact on poverty. For the poverty headcount measure, the estimates using survey mean income suggest that, on average, a 10 percent increase in the share of migrants in the country's population will lead to a 1.9 percent decline in the share of people living on less than $1.00 per person per day. This means that for a "representative" country if exactly one-half of the population lives below the poverty line of $1.00/person/day, a 10 percent increase in migration will bring the proportion living in poverty down to about 0.49, holding the level and distribution of income constant. International migration has a small, but statistically significant impact on poverty reduction, independent of the level of income and its distribution. Table 2 shows the results when equation (1) is estimated using remittances data.
The remittances variable -remittances as share of country GDP -has a negative and significant impact on all three measures of poverty: headcount, poverty gap and squared poverty gap. As was the case with the migration model, the size of the elasticity of poverty with respect to remittances is small. On average, the point estimates for the poverty headcount measure using survey mean income suggest that a 10 percent increase in the share of remittances in country GDP will lead to a 1.6 percent decline in the share of people living on less than $1.00 per person per day. Controlling for the level of income and income inequality, the more sensitive poverty measures -the poverty gap and squared poverty gap -suggest that international remittances will have a slightly larger impact on poverty reduction. The point estimates for the poverty gap and squared poverty gap suggest that, on average, a 10 percent increase in the share of remittances will lead to about a 2.0 percent decline in the depth and/or severity of poverty.
It is useful to speculate on the reasons why international migration and remittances have such a small -albeit statistically significant -impact on poverty reduction. As noted at the outset, both of these variables are probably underestimated with respect to their true values. The variable "migrants as a share of country population" is underestimated because it does not include the large number of people who illegally migrate to the United States or the OECD (Europe); also, this variable does not include the large number of migrants who go to work in other labor-receiving regions (like the Arab Gulf or South Africa). Similarly, the variable "remittances as share of country GDP" does not include the large (and unknown) amount of money that is remitted through private, unofficial channels. Since workers who migrate illegally are more likely to be poor and to remit through unofficial channels, it is likely that the variables used in this study underestimate the true impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in labor-exporting countries. If, in the future, it would be possible to get more accurate estimates of the number of legal and illegal migrants, and their official and unofficial remittances, it is likely that international migration and remittances would have an even stronger statistical impact on poverty reduction in the developing world.
Data problems notwithstanding, the results provide an intriguing puzzle and point to an important area for future work. Remittance flows can be treated analytically in the same way as any other increase in national income. Their poverty reducing impact derives from two sources: first, from an increase in per capita GDP or survey mean income (given the distribution of income); and second, from any contemporaneous change in the distribution of income that occurs as a result of the receipt of remittances by different income groups. If the distributional bias of remittance income to households is progressive, the poverty reducing impact of the increase in income will be greater than if the distribution had remained unchanged. A regressive bias will result in the opposite outcome.
In our econometric specifications we control for the level of per capita income and for its distribution. Yet we still find a significant independent poverty reducing impact of both migration and (more convincingly) remittances on the poverty headcount as well as some measures of depth and severity. Put another way, perhaps rather than express surprise at the small magnitudes of the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to the migration and remittance variables, we should be surprised that they are significant at all. Is there a "third channel" by which incomes remitted affect the level and severity of poverty in developing countries?
Our data do not permit us to move beyond speculation. But, one conjecture, at least, is consistent with the data. Because the distributional data change with less frequency than the poverty and income data, the migration and remittance variables may be picking up the effect of a progressive bias in the distribution of remittance income among households. In this case, while the main channel by which remittances reduce poverty is via the income variable, their distributional impact is captured by the independent migration/remittances variable. The fact that in the case of the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap the elasticity of the measure with respect to remittances is greater than for the headcount may lead some credence to this hypothesis.
Determinants of International Migration and Remittances
Since international migration and remittances reduce poverty in our full sample of developing countries, it is useful to explore the determinants of migration. In the literature the determinants of international migration are often analyzed using the type of gravity model suggested by M. Greenwood and George Borjas. 23 In general terms, such a model can be expressed as:
Where M ij is the migration flow between labor-exporting country i and labor-receiving region j, 24 p i is the population of labor-exporting country i, y i is the per capita income of labor-exporting country i, c ij is the costs of migrating from country i to j, and ε is an error term.
Unfortunately, equation (2) cannot be estimated because our data set contains no information on the costs of migration (c ij ). Since this problem is also common to other empirical studies, a typical solution is to use the shortest air distance between laborexporting and labor-receiving countries as a proxy variable. 25 This is the solution that will be adopted here: the costs of migrating will be measured by the air distance from the labor-exporting country to one of three labor-receiving regions (United States, OECD (Europe) or the Arab Gulf).
In addition to the three explanatory variables listed in equation (2) -population, income and migration costs -recent empirical work has suggested that other economic, demographic and political variables may also influence the decision to migrate. 26 From an economic standpoint, it is useful to enter both an income variable and its square in the equation to see if the propensity to migrate rises and then declines with level of country income (development). Some studies have also hypothesized that other economic variables -such as higher rates of income inequality, inflation and unemployment -tend to encourage migration from labor-exporting countries. 27 With respect to demographic factors, human capital theory argues that more educated people are more likely to migrate because they enjoy higher wage-earning opportunities in labor-receiving countries.
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Finally, policy variables -such as the level of government stability and a country's credit worthiness -may have an effect on migration. 29 The reasoning here is that people will be more likely to migrate from countries that are politically unstable or that have poor economic management as manifested by low international credit ratings.
Combining all of these variables together, the empirical version of the migration model to be estimated can be written as:
+ λ 6 log (ru i ) + λ 7 log(p i ) + λ 8 log(ed i ) + λ 9 log(gov i ) + λ 10 log(cr i ) + ε ij (i = 1, . ., N; j = 1, . ., N)
Where d ij is the distance between labor-exporting country i and labor-receiving region j, and for each labor-exporting country i, g is the level of income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient), y is income (measured by per capita GDP), rf is the rate of consumer inflation, ru is the rate of unemployment, p is the population density (people per square kilometer), ed is the share of the population over 25 years with a secondary education, gov is a measure of government stability, 30 and cr is the country's credit rating.
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In estimating equation (3) all of the variables are expressed in log terms. This means that the results can be interpreted as elasticities. Table 3 Table   4 .
The first, and most important, result concerns the distance variable. In all versions of the model the coefficient for distance is negatively and significantly related to migration. On average, a 10 percent increase in distance to a labor-receiving region will reduce the share of international migration from a country by between 9.5 and 15.3 percent.
This result, which is based on flows of legal migration between countries, parallels those of other studies. 32 It also accords with reality because a quick glance at Annex Table A1 shows that those countries which are closest to the United States -like Mexico and Jamaica --and the OECD (Europe) -like Morocco and Turkey --are also those countries which have the highest rates of international migration. All other things being constant, citizens of countries which are located close to major labor-receiving regions have a higher propensity to migrate because their costs of migration are lower.
Only two of the economic variables in Table 4 are significantly related with international migration: income inequality (Gini coefficient) and per capita GDP (and its square). The Gini coefficient is positively related to migration, which means that countries with higher levels of income inequality produce a larger share of international migrants. On average, a 10 percent increase in the Gini coefficient will raise the share of migration between 15.2 and 24.5 percent. At first glance, these elasticities appear to be quite large, but it is important to remember that a 10 percent change in the Gini coefficient is unusual. On the whole, Gini coefficients tend to be fairly stable over time.
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The statistically significant results for the per capita GDP variable (and its square) are instructive and suggest that an inverted U-shaped curve exists between the level of country income (development) and international migration. 34 In other words, developing countries with low or high per capita GDP incomes produce smaller shares of international migrants than do middle-income developing countries. In the data set the share of international migration in a country's population increases until a country has a per capita GDP income (in 1995 prices) of $1630, 35 and falls thereafter. This result, which has been observed elsewhere, 36 suggests that people from middle-income developing countries have a higher propensity to migrate because they are able to afford the travel costs associated with international migration, while people from higher-income developing countries lack the incentive to go work abroad. At the same time, people from low-income countries -like those in Sub-Saharan Africa -lack the financial means to become international migrants.
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Since the focus of this study is on international migration and poverty, it is instructive to replace the per capita GDP variable (and its square) in Table 4 with a poverty variable (headcount index of poverty) (and its square) and to re-estimate the equations. 38 This is done in equations 4(3), 4(5) and 4(7). The results show that the poverty variable is never statistically significant. In other words, while international migration statistically reduces the level of poverty in developing countries (Table 1) Both of the demographic variables in Table 4 -population density and share of population with high school education -are positively and significantly related to migration. The first outcome is sensible because it means that more populated countries also produce larger shares of migrants. The latter outcome is in accord with human capital theory, which suggests that more educated people -in this case, people with a secondary education --are more likely to migrate because they enjoy higher wageearning opportunities working abroad.
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The final variable which is statistically significant in Table 4 is country credit rating, which is negatively related to international migration. This result means that countries with a higher (i.e. better) credit rating produce a lower share of international migrants. One way to interpret this finding is that countries with better macro-economic management are able to achieve a higher credit rating in the international marketplace.
This in turn enables them to attract more foreign and domestic capital to create more jobs at home and reduce the need (incentive) for people to migrate abroad.
Conclusion
This paper has used a new data set of 74 low-and middle-income developing countries to examine the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty.
Five key findings emerge.
First, international migration -defined as the share of a country's population that is living abroad -has a strong, statistical impact on reducing poverty in the developing world. On average, a 10 percent increase in the share of international migrants in a country's population will lead to a 1.9 percent decline in the share of people living on less than $1.00 per person per day.
Second, as might be expected, distance to a major labor-receiving region (the United States, OECD (Europe) or Arab Gulf) has an important effect on the level of international migration. On average, the results suggest that a 10 percent increase in a country's distance to a major labor-receiving region will reduce the share of migration from that country by between 9.5 and 15.3 percent. This result is sensible because those countries which are located closest to the United States -like Mexico and Jamaica -and the OECD (Europe) -like Morocco and Turkey -are also those countries with the highest rates of international migration.
Third, an inverted U-shaped curve exists between the level of country per capita income and international migration. Developing countries with low or high per capita GDP produce smaller shares of international migrants than middle-income developing countries. People from low-income developing countries -like Sub-Saharan Africalack the financial means to become international migrants, while people from higherincome developing countries lack the incentive to go work abroad. At the same time, countries with higher levels of poverty ($1.00/person/day) do not produce more migrants.
This study finds no statistical relationship between the level of poverty headcount in a country and the share of international migration. When coupled together, these findings suggest that international migrants do not come from the poorest strata of either countries or society: because of the considerable travel costs associated with international migration, international migrants appear to come from those income groups in middleincome developing countries which are located above the poverty line. These "almost poor" people are pushed into international migration through a desire to improve what Oded Stark calls their "status of relative deprivation" vis-à-vis the rich. 41 More work is needed to clarify how these forces affect the propensity of people to migrate.
Fourth, this study finds that international remittances -defined as the share of remittances in country GDP -has a negative and statistically significant effect on all three poverty measures used in the analysis. On average, the point estimates for the poverty headcount measure suggest that a 10 percent increase in the share of remittances in country GDP will lead to a 1.6 percent decline in the share of people living on less than $1.00 per person per day. However, the more sensitive poverty measures -the poverty gap and squared poverty gap -suggest that international remittances will have a slightly larger impact on poverty reduction. The point estimates for the poverty gap and squared poverty gap suggest that a 10 percent increase in the share of remittances will lead to about a 2.0 percent decline in the depth and/or severity of poverty in the developing world. While international migrants do not come from the ranks of the poor, the income that migrants remit to their origin communities appears to both increase average income and to reduce both the incidence and severity of poverty.
The final finding is more of a plea than a conclusion. From the standpoint of future work on this topic, more attention needs to be paid to collecting and publishing better data on international migration and remittances. With respect to migration, it would be useful if developing countries would start publishing records on the number and destination of their international migrants. In many developing countries, these data are already being collected, but they are not being published. With respect to international remittances, the International Monetary Fund should make greater efforts to count the amount of remittance monies that are transmitted through private, unofficial channels.
Poor people, especially poor people from countries located near the major labor-receiving regions of the world, are more likely to remit through informal, unofficial channels. For this reason, a full and complete accounting of the impact of the remittances on poverty in the developing world needs more accurate data on the large and currently unknown level of unofficial remittance transfers. 38 In the data set these two variables -log per capita GDP and log poverty headcount --are highly correlated (-0.538), and so when they are both entered into the equations neither one of them is statistically significant. 39 Adams, Jr. provides some support for this hypothesis when he finds that the relationship between income and international migration in rural Egypt is an inverted U-shaped curve, with middle-income males having the highest propensity to migrate. See Adams, Jr., "Economic and Demographic Determinants of International Migration in Rural Egypt," p. 164. Table A1 for countries and survey dates. * Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. Sources: All poverty and inequality data from Annex Table A1 . Data on per capita GDP, consumer inflation, unemployment, population density, and secondary education from World Bank, SIMA database. Government stability data from PRS Group, International Country Risk Guide. Country credit ratings from International Investor. 
